

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**

Microsoft Corporation, a Washington State  
Corporation and Health-ISAC, Inc., a Florida non-  
profit organization,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Saad Fridi,

and

John Does 1-4, Controlling A Computer Network and  
Thereby Injuring Plaintiffs and Their Customers,

Defendants.

Case No.

**FILED UNDER SEAL  
PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE 5**

**DECLARATION OF JEFFREY L. POSTON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' *EX PARTE*  
APPLICATION FOR AN EMERGENCY TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND  
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

I, Jeffrey L. Poston, hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am a partner at the law firm of Crowell & Moring LLP (“Crowell”) and counsel of record for Plaintiffs Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) and Health-ISAC, Inc (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). I make this declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ Application for an Emergency *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Preliminary Injunction (“TRO Application”). I make this declaration of my own personal knowledge and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to the truth of the matters set forth herein.

**I. PARTIES**

2. Microsoft and Health-ISAC seek an Emergency *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order And Order To Show Cause Re Preliminary Injunction designed to disrupt the technical infrastructure built by Saad Fridi and John Does 1-4 (collectively “Tycoon 2FA

Defendants”), who manufacture and sell illegal phishing kits designed to steal sensitive information and perpetrate business email compromise, ransomware, and financial fraud against Microsoft and Health-ISAC and their customers. Tycoon 2FA Defendants develop, advertise, purchase, and implement phishing kits that are designed to infiltrate Microsoft systems; these phishing kits are advertised based on this capability. These phishing kits include email templates, fake website templates, domain registration services, customer support features designed to evade detection and lead victims to believe they are dealing with legitimate products. The kits are essentially “how to” manuals for cybercriminals to develop and execute attacks on email systems through phishing campaigns. To manage and direct this illegal activity, these Defendants have established and operate an infrastructure of websites and domains, which they use to target their victims, compromise their online accounts, compromise the security of their networks, and steal sensitive information from them. The Tycoon 2FA Defendants’ criminal acts cause irreparable harm to Microsoft, its customers, Health-ISAC, its members and the public.

3. As counsel of record for Plaintiffs, I am aware of previous Microsoft lawsuits brought to disable other types of unlawful, cybercriminal activities, including the “Waledac” Botnet in February 2010 in the Eastern District of Virginia, the “Rustock” Botnet in March 2011 in the Western District of Washington, the “Kelihos” Botnet in September 2011 in the Eastern District of Virginia, the “Zeus” Botnets in March 2012 in the Eastern District of New York, the “Bamital” Botnet in February 2013 in the Eastern District of Virginia, the “Citadel” Botnets in May 2013 in the Western District of North Carolina, the “ZeroAccess” Botnet in November 2013 in the Western District of Texas, the “Shylock” Botnet in June 2014 in the Eastern District of Virginia, the “Ramnit” Botnet in February 2015 in the Eastern District of

Virginia, the “Dorkbot” Botnet in November 2015 in the Eastern District of New York; the “Strontium” threat infrastructure in August 2016 in the Eastern District of Virginia; the “Phosphorous” threat infrastructure in March 2019 in the District of Columbia; the “Thallium” threat infrastructure in December 2019 in the Eastern District of Virginia; “Trickbot” threat infrastructure in October 2020 in the Eastern District of Virginia; the “ZLoader” malware operation in April 2022 in the Northern District of Georgia; the “Bohrium” threat infrastructure in May 2022 in the Eastern District of Virginia; the “Cracked Cobalt Strike” cybercriminal and malware operation in March 2023 in the Eastern District of New York; the CAPTCHA Fraud cyber hacking operation in December 2023 in the Southern District of New York; the “Star Blizzard” spear phishing operation in September 2024 in the District of Columbia; “Fake ONNX” phishing-as-a-service operation in November 2024 in the Eastern District of Virginia, and “RaccoonO365” phishing-as-a-service operation in August 2025 in the Southern District of New York (seeking takedown of a cybercriminal organization that sold similar phishing kits and used similar methodologies as the Tycoon 2FA Defendants).

4. Based on our experience with similar cybercriminal defendants, *ex parte* relief is necessary, as notice to the Tycoon 2FA would allow them to destroy the evidence of their illicit activity and give them an opportunity to move the instrumentalities they use to conduct their unlawful activity. This would render the relief Plaintiffs request and further prosecution of this matter futile.

5. Indeed, in circumstances where similarly situated cybercriminals and threat groups have learned of Microsoft’s attempts to disable the cybercriminal operation, they have attempted to migrate the infrastructure or activate new domains to prevent their technical

infrastructure from being taken down and seized. For example, when Microsoft sued the Rustock Botnet, Dorkbot Botnet, and ZeroAccess Botnet, the cybercriminals became aware of the suit and forthcoming takedown and took steps to defy and evade the court's orders, including destroying evidence of the cybercriminal operation. We conclude that there is a significant risk that the Tycoon 2FA Defendants would take similar evasive action here if they were made aware of the attempts to take down their technical infrastructure before this Court rules on Plaintiffs' *Ex Parte* TRO Application.

6. Plaintiffs' counsel has not attempted to provide notice of the TRO Application to the Tycoon 2FA Defendants and should not be required to provide notice at this time. We respectfully submit that good and sufficient reasons exist for this TRO Application to be made by Order to Show Cause in lieu of by notice of motion. Microsoft has previously sought and obtained *ex parte* temporary restraining orders against other cybercriminal groups in United States District Courts in *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-27*, Case No. 1:10-cv-00156 (E.D. Va. 2010) (Brinkema, J.); *Microsoft v. John Does, 1-11*, Case No. 2:11-cv-00222 (W.D. Wa. 2011) (Robart, J.); *Microsoft Corporation v. Dominique Piatti et al.*, Case No. 1:11-cv-01017 (E.D. Va., 2011) (Cacheris, J.); *Microsoft Corporation et al. v. John Does 1-39 et al.*, Case No. 12-cv-1335 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Johnson, J.); *Microsoft Corporation v. Peng Yong et al.*, Case No. 1:12-cv-1005 (E.D. Va. 2012) (Lee, J.); *Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1-18 et al.*, Case No. 1:13-cv-139 (E.D. Va. 2013) (Brinkema, J.); *Microsoft v. John Does 1-82*, Case No. 3:13-CV-00319 (W.D. N.C. 2013) (Mullen, J.); *Microsoft v. John Does 1-8*, Case No. A-13-CV-1014 (W.D. Tex 2013) (Sparks, J.); *Microsoft v. John Does 1-8*, Case No. 1:14-cv-811 (O'Grady, J.) (E.D. Va. 2014); *Microsoft v. John Does 1-3*, Case No. 1:15-cv-240 (E.D. Va. 2015) (Brinkema, J.); *Microsoft v. John Does 1-5*, 1:15-cv-06565 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

(Gleeson, J.); *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:16-cv-993 (E.D. Va. 2016) (Lee, J.); *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:19-cv-00716 (D.D.C. 2019) (Berman-Jackson, J.); *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:19-cv-01582 (E.D. Va. 2019) (O'Grady, J.); *Microsoft Corporation and FS-ISAC, Inc. v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:20-cv-1171 (E.D. Va. 2020) (Trenga, J.); *Microsoft Corporation, FS-ISAC, and Health-ISAC v. Malikov et al.*, Case No. 1:22-cv-1328 (N. D. Ga. 2022) (Cohen, J.); *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 122-cv-607 (E.D. Va. 2022) (Trenga, J.); *Microsoft Corporation, Fortra LLC, and Health-ISAC v. John Does 1-16*, Case No. 23-cv-2447 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (DeArcy Hall, J.); *Microsoft Corporation v. Tu et al.*, Case No. 23-cv-10685 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (Engelmayer, J.); *Microsoft Corporation and NGO-ISAC v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 24-cv-02719 (D.D.C. 2024) (Contreras, J.); *Microsoft and LF Projects v. Abanoub Nady and John Does 1-4*, 1:24-cv-2013-RDA (E.D. Va. 2024) (Alston, J.); *Microsoft Corporation and Health-ISAC v. Joshua Ogundipe and John Does 1-4*, 1:25-cv-07111 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (Rakoff, J.).

7. Plaintiffs have identified 330 Internet domains as part of the infrastructure of the Tycoon 2FA Defendants. The domains associated with the Tycoon 2FA Defendants' infrastructure and the contact information for registrants of those domains are set forth in **Appendix A** to the Complaint. A true and correct copy of **Appendix A** to the Complaint is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.

8. Investigators in Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, including Derek Richardson, who has provided a declaration in support of Plaintiffs' TRO Application, have worked to determine the true identities of the Tycoon 2FA Defendants. With respect to Saad Fridi and John Doe Defendants 1-4, the only publicly available contact information or identifying

information associated with the Tycoon 2FA Defendants are the email addresses they used to register the domains that form the Tycoon 2FA technical infrastructure.<sup>1</sup> Based on our experience, it is likely that the other contact information that has been provided by the Tycoon 2FA Defendants to the Internet domain name registrars, including, for example, individual and entity names, physical addresses, facsimile numbers, telephone numbers, or payment information are fictitious.

9. Based on our experience, the email addresses provided to the domain registrars are most likely to be the most accurate contact information. When registrants set up website domains and associated infrastructure they must receive confirmation from the Internet domain registrars via email to utilize and access the Internet domains. Further supporting this conclusion, in May 2010, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”)—an organization that administers the domain name system—issued a study indicating the ease with which name and physical mailing addresses for domain registrations—as opposed to email addresses— may be falsified. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 2** is a true and correct copy of the ICANN’s May 2010 study, “WHOIS Proxy/Privacy Service Abuse – Definition.”

10. Based on our experience and from Plaintiffs’ research, I believe that the most reliable contact information for effectuating communication with the Tycoon 2FA Defendants are the email addresses associated with the Tycoon 2FA Defendants’ domains provided to the Internet domain registrars. Once the Internet domain registrars and web hosting companies provide the email addresses or other valid contact information, Plaintiffs will provide notice

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<sup>1</sup> For Saad Fridi, DCU Investigators were able to identify additional email addresses that are associated with him. See Richardson Decl. ¶¶ 18-19.

using such contact information. Plaintiffs will also move for an order authorizing John Doe discovery so that Plaintiffs can subpoena the Internet domain registrars and determine if they have additional valid contact information. .

## **II. NOTICE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS**

### **A. Plaintiffs Will Provide Notice**

11. Once the TRO has been issued and the domains have been transferred to Microsoft, Crowell will attempt notice of any preliminary injunction hearing, as well as service of the Complaint by sending the pleadings and/or links to the pleadings to e-mail addresses, facsimile numbers and mailing addresses associated with the Tycoon 2FA Defendants or otherwise provided by the Tycoon 2FA Defendants to the domain registrars.

12. Moreover, once the TRO has been issued and the domains have been transferred to Microsoft, Crowell will attempt notice of any preliminary injunction hearing and service of the Complaint by publishing those pleadings on a publicly accessible website located at: [www.noticeofpleadings.com/Tycoon2FA](http://www.noticeofpleadings.com/Tycoon2FA). Crowell will publish such notice on the website for the duration of this litigation. The following information will be made available on the website:

- a. The information contained in the case caption and the content of the summons.
- b. The following summary statement of the object of the complaint and the demand for relief: "Plaintiffs Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") and Health-ISAC have sued Defendants Saad Fridi and John Does 1-4 associated with the Tycoon 2FA cybercriminal operation and domains listed in the documents set forth herein. Plaintiffs allege that the Tycoon 2FA Defendants have violated federal and state law by hosting a cybercriminal operation through these domains and selling, distributing, purchasing, and utilizing the Tycoon 2FA phishing kits that support a Phishing-as-a-Service enterprise. The phishing kits made and sold by the Tycoon 2FA Defendants facilitate sophisticated spear phishing and are designed to steal sensitive information that is then used to perpetrate additional cybercrimes including business email compromise, financial

fraud, and ransomware attacks. Tycoon 2FA Defendants have also committed intellectual property violations irreparably harming Plaintiffs' customers and member organizations. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction directing the registrars associated with these domains to take all steps necessary to disable access to and operation of these domains and that all content and material associated with these domains are to be isolated and preserved pending resolution of the dispute. Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction, other equitable relief and damages. Full copies of the pleading documents are available at [www.noticeofpleadings.com/Tycoon2FA](http://www.noticeofpleadings.com/Tycoon2FA).

- c. The date of first publication.
- d. The following text: "NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: READ THESE PAPERS CAREFULLY! You must "appear" in this case or the other side will win automatically. To "appear" you must file with the court a legal document called a "motion" or "answer." The "motion" or "answer" must be given to the court clerk or administrator within 21 days of the date of first publication specified herein. It must be in proper form and have proof of service on the Plaintiffs' attorneys, Jeffrey L. Poston at Crowell & Moring LLP, 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20004, [jposton@crowell.com](mailto:jposton@crowell.com). If you have questions, you should consult with your own attorney immediately."

13. Crowell will serve each of the Internet domain registries listed at **Appendix A** to the Complaint with all copies of all documents served on the Tycoon 2FA Defendants.

14. To the extent that Plaintiffs determine that any of the Tycoon 2FA Defendants has a physical address in the United States, Crowell will also attempt notice of any preliminary injunction hearing, as well as service of the complaint by personal delivery on such Tycoon 2FA Defendant at their physical address in the United States.

15. To the extent the identity of the Tycoon 2FA John Doe Defendants, as well as their physical address become known to Plaintiffs, Crowell will prepare Requests for Service Abroad of Judicial or Extrajudicial Documents to attempt notice of any TRO and preliminary injunction hearing, as well as service of the Complaint on any Tycoon 2FA Defendants that have provided contact information in foreign countries that are signatories to the Hague Convention on Service Abroad or any similar treaty, and will comply with the requirements

of those treaties. Upon entry of any TRO and to the extent Plaintiffs identify and locate John Doe Defendants, Crowell will execute and deliver these documents to the appropriate Central Authority and request, pursuant to the Hague Convention or similar treaty, that the Central Authority deliver these documents to the contact information provided by the Tycoon 2FA Defendants. I am informed, and therefore believe, that notice of the preliminary injunction hearing and service of the Complaint could take approximately three to six months or longer through this process.

**B. Notice Under ICANN Domain Name Registration Policies**

16. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 3** is a true and correct copy of a document describing ICANN's role. Exhibit 3 reflects the following: ICANN is a not-for-profit partnership formed in 1998. ICANN coordinates domain names and IP addresses (unique identifying numbers for computers throughout the world), which enables the operation of the global Internet. ICANN's responsibilities include running an accreditation system for domain name "registrars." Domain name registrars enter arrangements with individual "registrants" who wish to register particular domain names. ICANN has a contractual relationship with all accredited registrars that sets forth the registrars' obligations. The purpose of the requirements of ICANN's accreditation agreements with registrars is to provide a consistent and stable environment for the domain name system and hence the Internet.

17. A true and correct copy of the 2013 ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement between ICANN and domain name registrars is attached hereto as **Exhibit 4**.

18. The following summarizes provisions set forth in the ICANN accreditation agreements with registrars at Exhibit 4.

**ICANN Requires That Registrants Agree To Provide Accurate Contact Information**

19. Section 3.7.7.1 of the accreditation agreement provides that domain registrants will

provide the registrar accurate and reliable contact information. In particular, the domain name registrant:

“shall provide to Registrar accurate and reliable contact details and correct and update them within seven (7) days of any change during the term of the Registered Name registration, including: the full name, postal address, e-mail address, voice telephone number, and fax number if available of the Registered Name Holder; name of authorized person for contact purposes in the case of an Registered Name Holder that is an organization, association, or corporation....”

20. Section 3.7.7.2 of the accreditation agreement provides that if the registrant fails to respond for over 15 days to a registrar’s inquiry about inaccurate contact information, the domain may be cancelled. In particular, the domain name registrant’s:

“willful provision of inaccurate or unreliable information, its willful failure to update information provided to Registrar within seven (7) days of any change, or its failure to respond for over fifteen (15) days to inquiries by Registrar concerning the accuracy of contact details associated with the Registered Name Holder’s registration shall constitute a material breach of the Registered Name Holder-registrar contract and be a basis for suspension and/or cancellation of the Registered Name registration.”

**ICANN Requires That Registrants Agree To A Dispute Resolution Policy Under Which Notice Is Given By Sending The Complaint To The Registrant’s Contact Information**

21. Section 3.8 of the accreditation agreement provides that registrars shall require registrants to agree to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”). The UDRP is a policy between a registrar and its customer and is included in registration agreements for all ICANN-accredited registrars. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 5** is a true and correct copy of the UDRP.

22. As part of the registrant’s agreement to the UDRP, the registrant agrees to the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“Rules”). Attached hereto as **Exhibit 6** is a true and correct copy of the Rules.

23. Pursuant to the Rules, “Written Notice” of a complaint regarding a domain requires

electronic transmittal of the complaint to a domain registrant and hardcopy notification that the complaint was sent by electronic means. In particular, "Written Notice" is defined as:

"hardcopy notification by the Provider to the Respondent of the commencement of an administrative proceeding under the Policy which shall inform the respondent that a complaint has been filed against it, and which shall state that the Provider has electronically transmitted the complaint including any annexes to the Respondent by the means specified herein. Written notice does not include a hardcopy of the complaint itself or any annexes."

24. Pursuant to the Rules, notice of a complaint may be achieved by the registrar forwarding the complaint to the postal address, facsimile number and e-mail addresses of the domain registrant. In particular, the Rules define the procedure for providing notice as follows:

"(a) When forwarding a complaint, including any annexes, electronically to the Respondent, it shall be the Provider's responsibility to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent. Achieving actual notice, or employing the following measures to do so, shall discharge this responsibility:

(i) sending Written Notice of the complaint to all postal-mail and facsimile addresses (A) shown in the domain name's registration data in Registrar's Whois database for the registered domain-name holder, the technical contact, and the administrative contact and (B) supplied by Registrar to the Provider for the registration's billing contact; and

(ii) sending the complaint, including any annexes, in electronic form by e-mail to:

(A) the e-mail addresses for those technical, administrative and billing contacts;

(B) postmaster@<the contested domain name>; and

(C) if the domain name (or "www." followed by the domain name) resolves to an active web page other than a generic page the Provider concludes is maintained by a registrar or ISP for parking domain-names registered by multiple domain-name holders), any e-mail address shown or e-mail links on that web page; and

(iii) sending the complaint, including any annexes, to any e-mail address the Respondent has notified the Provider it prefers and, to the extent practicable, to all other e-mail addresses provided to the Provider by Complainant...”

25. The effect of the UDRP and the Rules is that domain name registrants agree that notice of a complaint relating to their domains may be provided by the foregoing means, including by sending the complaint to postal, facsimile and email addresses provided by registrants.

**ICANN Requires That Registrants Agree That Domains May Be Suspended Or Cancelled Pursuant To The Dispute Resolution Policy**

26. Section 3.7.7.11 of the accreditation agreement provides that registrars shall require that a domain name registrant “shall agree that its registration of the Registered Name shall be subject to suspension, cancellation, or transfer” pursuant to ICANN’s policies for the resolution of disputes concerning domain names.

**ICANN Requires That Registrants Agree Not To Use Domains In An Illegal Manner**

27. Under Section 2 of the UDRP, the domain registrant agrees that:

“By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not registering the domain for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or violates someone else’s rights.”

28. Similarly, Section 3.7.7.9 of the accreditation agreement provides that the domain name registrant “shall represent that, to the best of the Registered Name Holder’s knowledge and belief, neither the registration of the Registered Name nor the manner in which it is directly or indirectly used infringes the legal rights of any third party.”

**The TYCOON 2FA Defendants’ Internet Domain Registrars Send Account-Related**

### **Information To Customer-Provided Contacts**

29. The terms of service for Internet domain registrars used by the Tycoon 2FA Defendants provide that their customers must provide contact information, including the email address, postal address, and a valid telephone number where they can reach their customers. These Internet domain registrars further provide that they may contact their respective customers based on the information provided by that customer. For example, one of the Registrars that Tycoon 2FA Defendants have used to register their domains is NameSilo. NameSilo's General Terms and Conditions, available at <https://www.namesilo.com/Support/General-Terms-and-Conditions>, include such provisions. Similarly, Key-Systems GmbH's ("Key-Systems") Registration Agreement, available at <https://www.key-systems.net/en/registration-agreement>, also includes such provisions. A true and correct copy of each NameSilo's General Terms and Conditions and Key-Systems' Registration Agreement are attached hereto as **Exhibit 7**. The other Registrars, such as NameCheap, Cloudflare, and GoDaddy, that Tycoon 2FA Defendants have used to register the domains they use in connection with their cybercriminal operation have similar terms and conditions, with provisions regarding customer contact information.

30. Based on our experience and our research of third parties that the Tycoon 2FA Defendants use to provide domain name services, the other third party Internet domain name registrars require that similar contact information be provided.

### **The Tycoon 2FA Defendants' Internet Domain Name Registrars' Terms Of Service Prohibit Customers From Using Services In An Illegal Manner**

31. The Internet domain registrars' terms of service prohibit customers, including the Tycoon 2FA Defendants, from using the services in an illegal manner, and customer accounts may be terminated for violation of those terms. For example, NameSilo's agreement

prohibits, among other conduct, the registered domain being used for:

- e. registration of prohibited domain name(s),
- f. abuse of NameSilo's services,
- g. payment irregularities,
- h. illegal conduct,
- i. failure to keep account or WHOIS information accurate and up to date,
- j. failure to respond to inquiries from NameSilo for over three (3) calendar days,
- k. if use of NameSilo's services involves NameSilo in a violation of any third party's rights or acceptable use policies, including but not limited to the transmission of unsolicited email, the violation of any copyright, or the distribution of any form of malware (defined to include, without limitation, malicious code or software that might affect the operation of the Internet),
- l. to comply with any applicable court orders, laws, government rules or requirements, requests of law enforcement or other governmental agency or organization, or any dispute resolution process,
- m. to avoid any liability, civil or criminal, on the part of NameSilo, as, well as its affiliates, subsidiaries, officers, directors, and employees,
- n. to protect the integrity, security and stability of the Domain Name system (DNS), or
- o. failure to respond to inquiries from NameSilo regarding payment inquiries for over 24 hours

32. NameSilo's policies also provide that it may suspend or terminate its customer's services if that customer has been found to engage in prohibited conduct. Based on our experience and our current research of other Internet domain registrars, and on information and belief, the other Internet domain registrars used by the Tycoon 2FA Defendants, such as NameCheap, Cloudflare, and GoDaddy prohibit similar unlawful conduct.

### **III. OTHER AUTHORITY AND EVIDENCE**

33. Many Courts have granted the requested *ex parte* relief Plaintiffs seek against

similarly situated cybercriminal organizations.. Additionally, Plaintiffs' proposed alternative service has previously been approved in other actions brought by Microsoft to halt other cybercriminal organizations that, like the Tycoon 2FA Defendants, carry out their unlawful activity through the use of a technical infrastructure using Internet domains.

34. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 8** is a true and correct copy of the March 15, 2019 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:19-cv-00716-ABJ (D.D.C. 2019) (Berman-Jackson, J.).

35. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 9** is a true and correct copy of the December 18, 2019 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:19-cv-01582 (E.D. Va. 2019) (O'Grady, J.).

36. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 10** is a true and correct copy of the May 1, 2020 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *Sophos v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:20-cv-00502 (E.D. Va. 2020) (O'Grady, J.).

37. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 11** is a true and correct copy of the July 1, 2020 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:20-cv-00730 (E.D. Va. 2020) (O'Grady, J.).

38. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 12** is a true and correct copy of the July 22, 2020 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *DXC Technology Company v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:20-cv-00814 (E.D. Va. 2020) (Alston, J.).

39. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 13** is a true and correct copy of the October 6, 2020 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft and FS-ISAC v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 1:20-cv-1171 (E.D. Va. 2020) (Trenga, J.).

40. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 14** is a true and correct copy of the April 8, 2022

*Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft, FS-ISAC, and Health-ISAC v. Malikov et al.*, Case No. 1:22-cv-1328 (N. D. Ga. 2022) (Cohen, J.)

41. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 15** is a true and correct copy of the May 27, 2022 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft v. John Does 1-2*, Case No: 122-cv-607 (E.D. Va. 2022) (Trenga, J.)

42. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 16** is a true and correct copy of the March 31, 2023 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order To Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft, Fortra, and Health-ISAC v. John Does 1-16*, Case No. 23-cv-2447 (E.D.N.Y 2023) (Morrison, J.)

43. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 17** is a true and correct copy of the September 25, 2024 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft and NGO-ISAC v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 24-cv-02719 (D.D.C. 2024) (Contreras, J.)

44. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 18** is a true and correct copy of the August 5, 2016 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 16-cv-00993 (E.D. Va. 2016) (Lee, J.)

45. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 19** is a true and correct copy of the July 16, 2021 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-2*, Case No. 21-cv-00822 (E.D. Va. 2021) (Alston, J.)

46. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 20** is a true and correct copy of the December 2, 2021 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-2*, Case 21-cv-01346 (E.D. Va. 2019) (Brinkema, J.)

47. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 21** is a true and correct copy of the November 13, 2024 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-4*, Case 1:24-cv-2013-RDA (E.D.Va. 2024) (Alston, J.)


48. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 22** is a true and correct copy of the December 13, 2023 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft Corporation v. Tu et al.*, Case No. 23-cv-10685 (S.D.N.Y 2023) (Engelmayer, J.)

49. Attached hereto as **Exhibit 23** is a true and correct copy of August 27, 2025 *Ex Parte* Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause in the matter of *Microsoft Corporation and Health-ISAC v. Ogundipe et al.*, Case No. 25-cv-7111 (S.D.N.Y 2025) (Rakoff, J.)

50. In each of the cases identified in the foregoing paragraphs, the Court granted similar *ex parte relief* to take down the cybercriminal operation's technical infrastructure and authorized alternative service as requested here.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed this 24th day of February, 2026 in New York, New York

  
Jeffrey L. Poston